skill-router

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses authoritative instructions to mandate a behavior override, directing the agent to "Use this before starting substantive work on ANY request." This establishes a persistent interception layer that attempts to govern all user interactions before the agent proceeds with its primary task.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to discover, read, and prioritize instructions from all files found in specific local directories, creating an ingestion surface for untrusted content.
  • Ingestion points: Local filesystem paths such as ~/.claude/skills/ and .claude/skills/ are targeted for scanning all SKILL.md files regardless of their publisher or source.
  • Boundary markers: None. The agent is not instructed to treat the discovered content as external or untrusted data, nor are delimiters provided to isolate the ingested frontmatter.
  • Capability inventory: The skill encourages the agent to traverse the local filesystem and read the contents of various directories to identify available skills.
  • Sanitization: None. The agent is directed to judge the relevance of the raw name and description fields from discovered files and is explicitly told to "use them instead of improvising a process from scratch," effectively allowing third-party file content to dictate its behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 22, 2026, 11:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-router