soia-cwork-feishu-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the official
@larksuite/cliNode.js package, which is installed usingnpxif not already present on the system. This is an official utility from a well-known service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/setup_app_credentials.pyuses the Pythonsubprocessmodule to configure and interact with thelark-clitool. It handles the Feishu App Secret by passing it through standard input (stdin) to the CLI command, ensuring the sensitive value is not exposed in the process argument list or system logs. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages Feishu application credentials (App ID and App Secret). It uses a local YAML configuration file (
~/.config/soia-skills/soia-cwork-feishu-cli/config.yml) and provides a dedicated script to initialize the CLI profile. The implementation follows safe handling practices to minimize the risk of credential exposure. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Feishu documents, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Document content and metadata fetched via
lark-clicommands (e.g.,docs +fetch,wiki +node-list). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute variouslark-clicommands for data retrieval and profile management. - Sanitization: No programmatic sanitization or filtering of the document content is performed before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata