soia-pkm-alipan-drive-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a controlled wrapper script,
scripts/run_with_env.py, which usessubprocess.runto execute thealiyunpancommand-line interface. It includes a whitelist (ALLOWED_EXECUTABLES) to prevent the execution of arbitrary commands, ensuring the agent's capabilities are restricted to the intended cloud drive operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the cloud drive in the form of filenames and directory listings, which are processed by the agent (e.g., during
lsoperations or when usingscripts/scan_drive.py). The absence of boundary markers or instructions to disregard instructions potentially embedded within these filenames presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. Evidence:scripts/scan_drive.pyparses file and directory names into JSONL format which is then processed by other skills. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructions are provided to install the
aliyunpanCLI tool via Homebrew and other vendor-specific components vianpxand the Claude plugin system. These downloads originate from well-known registries and established developer tools. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages sensitive authentication materials for Aliyunpan. It does not hardcode credentials but provides explicit operational guidelines to prevent the accidental exposure of tokens or session data. It uses a private configuration file for environment variables to keep secrets out of the codebase and includes a wrapper script designed to avoid echoing command-line arguments that might contain secrets.
Audit Metadata