soia-pkm-clip-drive
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data by extracting text from documents (PDF, Word, spreadsheets). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in source documents could influence agent behavior during processing or subsequent vault management stages.
- Ingestion points: Local and cloud-hosted files such as PDF, DOCX, XLSX, and Markdown as specified in the skill's processing logic.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters to isolate extracted content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has read/write access to the local file system and can execute scripts for indexing and OCR.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted document text is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for its installation and vault health verification processes.
- Evidence: Installation instructions involve
npx skills addandclaude plugin install. The skill also references the execution ofvault_index_verify.pyfor indexing checks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads necessary plugins and scripts from the developer's official repository.
- Evidence: Fetching resources from
github.com/soia-team/soia-open-skillsand thesoia-pkm-vault@soiaplugin.
Audit Metadata