soia-pkm-clip-drive

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data by extracting text from documents (PDF, Word, spreadsheets). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in source documents could influence agent behavior during processing or subsequent vault management stages.
  • Ingestion points: Local and cloud-hosted files such as PDF, DOCX, XLSX, and Markdown as specified in the skill's processing logic.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters to isolate extracted content from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has read/write access to the local file system and can execute scripts for indexing and OCR.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the extracted document text is documented.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for its installation and vault health verification processes.
  • Evidence: Installation instructions involve npx skills add and claude plugin install. The skill also references the execution of vault_index_verify.py for indexing checks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads necessary plugins and scripts from the developer's official repository.
  • Evidence: Fetching resources from github.com/soia-team/soia-open-skills and the soia-pkm-vault@soia plugin.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 08:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — soia-pkm-clip-drive