soia-pkm-clip-x
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through data ingestion.
- Ingestion points: External content is ingested from the X platform via fxtwitter API (in
scripts/archive_x.py) and from Telegram Saved Messages via the Telethon library (inscripts/sync_telegram_saved.py). - Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Summary) and HTML comments (e.g.,<!-- AI 补充:1 句话 30-80 字浓缩 -->) as placeholders for the AI to fill. While these provide structure, they do not strictly prevent the AI from following instructions embedded in the ingested content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the user's Obsidian vault and execute local Python scripts via
subprocess.run(inscripts/sync_telegram_export.pyandscripts/sync_telegram_saved.py). - Sanitization: The scripts perform sanitization for filenames and metadata fields, but the actual content of the tweets or articles is processed as raw text for summarization and translation, providing a surface for adversarial content to influence the agent's output.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The synchronization scripts
scripts/sync_telegram_export.pyandscripts/sync_telegram_saved.pyutilizesubprocess.runto call the companion scriptarchive_x.py. While the inputs are passed as an argument list which mitigates shell injection risks, this pattern allows the execution of local files based on parameters derived from external data (URLs). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from
api.fxtwitter.comand Telegram's MTProto API. These operations are core to the skill's intended purpose of archiving remote social media content.
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