soia-pkm-clip-x

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through data ingestion.
  • Ingestion points: External content is ingested from the X platform via fxtwitter API (in scripts/archive_x.py) and from Telegram Saved Messages via the Telethon library (in scripts/sync_telegram_saved.py).
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown headers (e.g., ## Summary) and HTML comments (e.g., <!-- AI 补充:1 句话 30-80 字浓缩 -->) as placeholders for the AI to fill. While these provide structure, they do not strictly prevent the AI from following instructions embedded in the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the user's Obsidian vault and execute local Python scripts via subprocess.run (in scripts/sync_telegram_export.py and scripts/sync_telegram_saved.py).
  • Sanitization: The scripts perform sanitization for filenames and metadata fields, but the actual content of the tweets or articles is processed as raw text for summarization and translation, providing a surface for adversarial content to influence the agent's output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The synchronization scripts scripts/sync_telegram_export.py and scripts/sync_telegram_saved.py utilize subprocess.run to call the companion script archive_x.py. While the inputs are passed as an argument list which mitigates shell injection risks, this pattern allows the execution of local files based on parameters derived from external data (URLs).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from api.fxtwitter.com and Telegram's MTProto API. These operations are core to the skill's intended purpose of archiving remote social media content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 6, 2026, 08:06 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — soia-pkm-clip-x