soia-design-explorer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install a third-party dependency huashu-design from an external source (alchaincyf/huashu-design) that is not identified as a well-known or trusted vendor resource.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation of the external dependency is performed via npx skills add alchaincyf/huashu-design -g -y, which executes remote package code on the host system during the setup process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands such as test -f to validate paths and assumes the ability to run verification scripts or browser-based tools like Playwright to confirm the output.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted external data (brand guidelines, design assets, and URLs) to generate high-fidelity prototypes and reviews.
  • Ingestion points: Design assets, brand guidelines (files/URLs), and product screenshots processed in SKILL.md (Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to the agent regarding embedded instructions in user-provided assets or external URLs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive file-write capabilities (across temp, state, and delivery directories) and shell execution permissions through its automated workflow.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No validation or filtering of the content from external inputs is performed before the agent processes them as part of the design creation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 17, 2026, 04:58 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — soia-design-explorer