dflow-docs
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an installation command
curl -fsS https://cli.dflow.net | sh. This is a high-risk execution pattern that downloads a script from a remote URL and pipes it directly into a shell interpreter. This allows the remote server to execute arbitrary code on the user's system without prior verification or integrity checks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a documentation index from
https://pond.dflow.net/llms.txtand saves it to a local path (skills/dflow-docs/llms.txt). It also references a hosted MCP server athttps://pond.dflow.net/mcp. These actions create a runtime dependency on external vendor infrastructure. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several shell commands to manage its lifecycle, including
curlfor networking,shfor script execution, andsedfor reading local documentation files. It also utilizes thedflowCLI for platform interactions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by downloading a remote text file (
llms.txt) and instructing the agent to read its contents into the current context. - Ingestion points:
skills/dflow-docs/llms.txt(referenced and updated viacurlandsedcommands in SKILL.md) - Boundary markers: None identified; external content is read directly into context.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
sh), file system writes (curl -o), and network operations (curl). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the downloaded content is performed before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.dflow.net, https://pond.dflow.net/llms.txt - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata