percolator-bounty
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses highly sensitive private key material by reading from the default Solana CLI keypair path at
~/.config/solana/id.json. - Evidence: Found in
src/cli.tswithin theloadKeypairfunction which attempts to read and parse the JSON secret key from the home directory. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs unauthorized file system writes outside of its own directory by creating folders and copying files to the user's home directory (
~/.openclawd/goals). - Evidence: The
register-goalcommand insrc/cli.tsusesmkdirSyncandcopyFileSyncto persist a goal document to the user's personal configuration space. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a path traversal pattern when locating source documents for registration.
- Evidence: In
src/cli.ts, the code attempts to access a path three levels above the execution directory (../../../goals/percolator-bounty.md), which may target files outside the intended skill sandbox.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata