ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to operate in a "non-interactive, fully automated" mode, specifically ordering it to "Do NOT ask for confirmation at any step" and "Never ask for trivial confirmations." This suppresses the standard human-in-the-loop safety checks for impactful actions like pushing code or creating pull requests.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the
Bashtool to execute arbitrary local project scripts (pnpm run build/lint/test) and system-level commands (git,gh). This assumes the integrity of the project's own configuration and scripts, which the agent executes automatically. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit local source code, commit history, and internal project metadata to external git hosting providers via
git pushandgh pr createoperations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the local environment and git history.
- Ingestion points: Commit messages retrieved via
git log, file changes fromgit diff, and project management files found in~/.claude/plansor~/.gstack/projects. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide the agent or its subagents with delimiters or instructions to treat this external data as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (
Bash), modify the filesystem (Edit,Write), and orchestrate additional autonomous sub-tasks (Agent). - Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering of the ingested content is performed before it is used to influence the agent's logic or generate the final pull request descriptions.
Audit Metadata