ship

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to operate in a "non-interactive, fully automated" mode, specifically ordering it to "Do NOT ask for confirmation at any step" and "Never ask for trivial confirmations." This suppresses the standard human-in-the-loop safety checks for impactful actions like pushing code or creating pull requests.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the Bash tool to execute arbitrary local project scripts (pnpm run build/lint/test) and system-level commands (git, gh). This assumes the integrity of the project's own configuration and scripts, which the agent executes automatically.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to transmit local source code, commit history, and internal project metadata to external git hosting providers via git push and gh pr create operations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the local environment and git history.
  • Ingestion points: Commit messages retrieved via git log, file changes from git diff, and project management files found in ~/.claude/plans or ~/.gstack/projects.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not provide the agent or its subagents with delimiters or instructions to treat this external data as untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands (Bash), modify the filesystem (Edit, Write), and orchestrate additional autonomous sub-tasks (Agent).
  • Sanitization: No validation, escaping, or filtering of the ingested content is performed before it is used to influence the agent's logic or generate the final pull request descriptions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 28, 2026, 07:25 PM