agents-sdk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents interfaces for processing untrusted data, creating potential injection surfaces.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through email handlers (
onEmailinreferences/email.md), webhook endpoints (onRequestinreferences/webhooks-push.md), and web scraping tools (browser_executeinreferences/browse-the-web.md). - Boundary markers: While using standard SDK message conversion utilities, the documentation does not demonstrate explicit delimiting of external content within prompts.
- Capability inventory: Agents built using these patterns have access to SQL databases (
this.sql), sandboxed JavaScript execution (codemode), and browser control. - Sanitization: The documentation explicitly covers security best practices such as signature verification for webhooks and secure HMAC-based reply routing for emails to ensure data authenticity.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes experimental features designed for runtime code generation and execution by the agent.
- Evidence: The
Codemodefeature (references/codemode.md) enables LLMs to write JavaScript that executes in an isolated Worker sandbox usingDynamicWorkerExecutor. - Evidence: The
browser_executetool (references/browse-the-web.md) allows LLMs to script browser interactions using CDP. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to several standard and official packages for installation via npm.
- Evidence: Instructions include installing
agents,@cloudflare/codemode, andaifrom the public registry to support SDK functionality.
Audit Metadata