jira
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and local files, which the agent then processes to perform actions in Jira.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content via
acli jira workitem viewandacli jira workitem searchcommands, as well as local files via the--from-fileand--from-jsonflags. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to help it distinguish between data content and potentially malicious embedded instructions within tickets or files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
acli), read local files, and write output to the local file system (as demonstrated in theticket-template.jsonexample). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined to filter or escape the content retrieved from Jira or local files before the agent acts upon it.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is the execution of shell commands using the
aclitool. While this is the intended design, it requires the agent to have command-line execution privileges and relies on the user's existing CLI authentication state (acli jira auth status).
Audit Metadata