agent-bridge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes
git diff --statto harvest information about completed and pending work within the project. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface because it aggregates untrusted data from session history and code changes, then writes this data into instruction-carrying configuration files like
.cursorrulesandCLAUDE.md. - Ingestion points: Project status (via
git diff) and session history from current files are captured in the Bridge workflow. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly describe the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to encapsulate harvested content within the generated target agent configuration files.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file-write operations to
.agent-monad/handoff.md,CLAUDE.md, and.cursorrulesto influence future agent behaviors. - Sanitization: No mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping potentially malicious instructions embedded in the project files or conversation history are identified.
Audit Metadata