binlee-advisor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
get_article_summaryfunction inscripts/consult.shis vulnerable to Python code injection. It uses shell variable interpolation to place the$slugargument into apython3 -ccommand string. This allows for arbitrary Python code execution if the argument is maliciously crafted by providing a string that closes the Python function and executes system commands.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Thesearch_relatedandsearch_and_summarizefunctions inscripts/consult.share vulnerable to argument injection. The$queryvariable is passed directly to thegrepcommand without sanitization or the use of--to terminate options, which can be used to inject malicious flags to read unintended files or modify command behavior.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Article data is ingested from JSON files located in
~/drli_articles/via theconsult.shscript.\n - Boundary markers: There are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the article content is printed for the agent.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates file reading and Python execution via its consulting script.\n
- Sanitization: The script does not perform any sanitization or escaping of the content retrieved from the article data files before displaying it to the agent context.
Audit Metadata