handover
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the
mawutility and standard binaries (mkdir,readlink) to manage local states. User-provided arguments like<oracle-name>and<instruction>are interpolated directly into these shell commands, which presents a risk of command injection if the inputs contain shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes instructions to override standard safety protocols by explicitly stating "Do NOT ask for confirmation" and "Do NOT enter plan mode." This bypasses human-in-the-loop oversight for the execution of shell commands and the waking of other processes.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as a relay for user input, passing raw text to other agents via the
maw heycommand. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious instruction could be passed through this skill to exploit the target agent (Oracle). Evidence for this surface in SKILL.md: - Ingestion points: User-provided
<instruction>from$ARGUMENTS. - Boundary markers: None; the instruction is placed directly inside a double-quoted string.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
maw wakeandmaw hey. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the instruction before it is passed to the shell or the target agent.
Audit Metadata