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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection via its message retrieval functionality.
- Ingestion points: The
maw peekcommand (in SKILL.md) retrieves message content from external nodes in the federation and displays it to the agent. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate external message content from the agent's primary instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits shell command execution (including
maw,git,grep, andhostname). - Sanitization: No filtering or escaping is applied to the incoming message content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for its primary operations and metadata gathering.
- The 'Step 0' logic executes several system and repository commands (
hostname,git rev-parse,grep,sed) to resolve the agent's handle and host identity. - The
sendandpeekoperations utilize themawcommand-line interface. While variables like$MSGand$TARGETare quoted in the provided shell snippets, the reliance on shell execution to handle remote message data increases the overall attack surface.
Audit Metadata