inbox

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied input (<topic> and <sender>) directly into shell commands via echo "<topic>". This creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, backticks, or command substitution syntax (e.g., $(...)), as these would be executed before the intended sanitization steps (tr and sed) are applied.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and displays content from markdown files stored in the inbox, introducing an indirect prompt injection vulnerability where malicious instructions within a note could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Content is ingested from .md files located in the ψ/inbox/ directory during read operations in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or guardrail instructions are used to distinguish retrieved note content from the agent's system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows for file system operations including listing, moving, and archiving files, as well as invoking MCP tools like oracle_inbox and oracle_handoff.
  • Sanitization: While filenames are sanitized to prevent path traversal, the actual content of the markdown files is not sanitized or validated before being returned to the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 18, 2026, 01:15 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — inbox