inbox
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates user-supplied input (
<topic>and<sender>) directly into shell commands viaecho "<topic>". This creates a risk of command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons, backticks, or command substitution syntax (e.g.,$(...)), as these would be executed before the intended sanitization steps (trandsed) are applied. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and displays content from markdown files stored in the inbox, introducing an indirect prompt injection vulnerability where malicious instructions within a note could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from
.mdfiles located in theψ/inbox/directory during read operations inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or guardrail instructions are used to distinguish retrieved note content from the agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for file system operations including listing, moving, and archiving files, as well as invoking MCP tools like
oracle_inboxandoracle_handoff. - Sanitization: While filenames are sanitized to prevent path traversal, the actual content of the markdown files is not sanitized or validated before being returned to the agent context.
Audit Metadata