mailbox
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mailbox.shtakes user-controlled arguments via$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.mdand passes them directly to a bash script. While it uses"$*"for content, which prevents some word-splitting issues, theloadandreadcommands output file content directly to the console where an agent will process it. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to store agent findings and 'standing orders' persistently in the
ψ/memory/mailbox/directory. While this is the intended functionality, it creates a repository of agent context and potentially sensitive task findings that could be read by any subsequent agent session. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads files from
ψ/memory/mailbox/(e.g.,standing-orders.md,*_findings.md) and outputs them into the agent's current prompt context. - Boundary markers: Missing. Content is output with headers like
## Previous Contextbut without strong 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the processing agent. - Capability inventory: The skill allows arbitrary file writes (
write,orders) and reads within its storage directory. The agent processing the 'loaded' context has full CLI capabilities. - Sanitization: None. The content is written to and read from markdown files exactly as provided.
- [PERSISTENCE]: While legitimate for the use case, the skill explicitly implements a persistence mechanism to preserve instructions and 'standing orders' across agent sessions, effectively creating a persistent state that bypasses the ephemeral nature of standard agent sessions.
Audit Metadata