soul
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using user-provided input without apparent sanitization.\n
- In
SKILL.md, the variableARGis assigned the user's input and then used in a shell subshell:ROOT=$(maw locate "$ARG" --path 2>/dev/null). This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the user provides crafted input containing shell metacharacters.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a mechanism to dynamically load and execute code from external sources.\n - The
scripts/soul.tsscript usessymlinkSyncto link external skill directories into the local project's.claude/skills/directory. Since the agent platform automatically loads skills from this path, this allows for the execution of arbitrary skill logic defined in any repository the user specifies.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill consumes unverified content from external repositories that directly influences the agent's behavior.\n - It reads identity-defining files (e.g.,
SOUL.md,IDENTITY.md,CLAUDE.md) and 'learning' files from the target Oracle repo. These contents are added to the agent's context, providing a vector for instructions embedded in these files to override the agent's persona or instructions.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill automatically modifies the repository's configuration to maintain its presence and avoid detection.\n - It appends paths for the symlinked skills and its own manifest files to
.git/info/exclude. This ensures the skill's modifications persist across sessions while remaining hidden from standardgit statusorgit addoperations, a technique used to maintain a footprint in a repository without appearing in version control history.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata