talk-to
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential Shell Command Injection. The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using templates like
maw hey {MAW or agent-oracle} '{preview}'andecho "$MESSAGE" > "$INBOX/...". If the{preview},{MAW}, or{agent}variables contain unescaped single quotes or other shell metacharacters, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the host system. For example, a message preview containing a closing single quote followed by a command (e.g.,'; touch /tmp/pwned; ') would result in the execution of the injected command. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The 'loop' functionality (Mode 4) creates an autonomous loop where the agent reads responses from other agents and uses that content to decide its next action.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from external agents via
arra_thread_read({ threadId })within the autonomous loop described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the incoming message content as untrusted data, making the agent susceptible to instructions embedded in responses from other agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including shell command execution (
maw), filesystem write access (ψ/inbox/), and the ability to create/post to messaging threads (arra_thread). - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation is performed on the content received from the
arra_thread_readtool before it is processed by the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata