talk-to

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Potential Shell Command Injection. The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands using templates like maw hey {MAW or agent-oracle} '{preview}' and echo "$MESSAGE" > "$INBOX/...". If the {preview}, {MAW}, or {agent} variables contain unescaped single quotes or other shell metacharacters, an attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the host system. For example, a message preview containing a closing single quote followed by a command (e.g., '; touch /tmp/pwned; ') would result in the execution of the injected command.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The 'loop' functionality (Mode 4) creates an autonomous loop where the agent reads responses from other agents and uses that content to decide its next action.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from external agents via arra_thread_read({ threadId }) within the autonomous loop described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions to treat the incoming message content as untrusted data, making the agent susceptible to instructions embedded in responses from other agents.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including shell command execution (maw), filesystem write access (ψ/inbox/), and the ability to create/post to messaging threads (arra_thread).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation is performed on the content received from the arra_thread_read tool before it is processed by the agent's logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 21, 2026, 12:32 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — talk-to