baoyu-comic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted source material (user-provided articles or stories) as described in
workflow.md(Step 1.2) to generate storyboards and image prompts. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded in the source content could influence the agent's logic.\n - Ingestion points: Source content is saved to
source.mdand analyzed to produceanalysis.md,storyboard.md, and subsequent image prompts.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the source material.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write various files to the local file system, execute the
merge-to-pdf.tsscript, and invoke external image generation tools vianpx.\n - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the source text is performed before it is used in the narrative generation process.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of shell commands and local TypeScript scripts to perform its tasks.\n
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandworkflow.mddirect the agent to runnpx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/merge-to-pdf.tsandnpx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/../baoyu-image-gen/scripts/main.ts.\n - System Tools: The skill also suggests using system utilities like
pngquant,optipng, orsipsfor image compression inSKILL.mdStep 7.1.
Audit Metadata