global-content-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
child_process.spawnSyncinsrc/platforms/agentReach.jsto run multiple external CLI tools such asagent-reach,opencli,bili,xhs, andmcporter. This represents a high-privilege capability within the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The function
runCustomDouyininsrc/platforms/agentReach.jsexecutes a command defined by theDOUYIN_COMMANDenvironment variable. If an attacker can influence environment variables, they could achieve arbitrary command execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
commandExistsfunction insrc/platforms/agentReach.jspasses a variable directly into a shell string:sh -lc "command -v ${command}". Whencommandis sourced from the user-controlledDOUYIN_COMMANDenvironment variable, it creates a surface for shell command injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) as it processes untrusted data from external sources and possesses command execution capabilities.
- Ingestion points:
src/platforms/agentReach.js(Fetches video details, search results, and comments from Bilibili and Guaikei API). - Boundary markers: None identified. Data is interpolated directly into console outputs and JSON results.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
spawnSyncinsrc/platforms/agentReach.js. - Sanitization:
src/validate/keyword.jsperforms basic character cleaning for keywords, but does not sanitize the content retrieved from external APIs before outputting or logging. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requires the
GUAIKEI_API_TOKENenvironment variable for fallback operations. While it follows the standard practice of using environment variables rather than hardcoding, the token is transmitted towww.guaikei.comwhich is a third-party service.
Audit Metadata