space-image-studio

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to command injection in its image generation workflow. Step 5 executes a shell command that uses shell substitution ($(cat /tmp/space-image-studio-prompt.txt)) to pass the prompt as an argument. Since the prompt includes unsanitized user input (titles, descriptions, etc.), an attacker can craft inputs with shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, $(...), `) to execute arbitrary code on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The output path for generated images is constructed using a {slug} variable derived from user-provided content: ~/Documents/GitHub/obsidian/09 image/space-image-studio/{YYYY-MM-DD}/{type}-{slug}-{HHMMSS}.png. The absence of sanitization or validation on this variable allows for path traversal attacks, potentially enabling the skill to overwrite sensitive files outside the designated output directory.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User-provided descriptions and the resulting prompts are sent to an external API (https://api.labnana.com) for processing. This involves the transmission of potentially sensitive information to a third-party service not included in the platform's trusted domain list.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill relies on an API key stored in a .labnana.env file and instructs the agent to source this file. This pattern loads secrets directly into the shell environment, exposing them to any subsequent processes executed in the same session.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface due to its ingestion and processing of untrusted user data that is later used in high-privilege shell operations.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md Step 2 (user input for image content fields).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or safety warnings are present in the prompt templates (e.g., references/prompt-templates/base.md).
  • Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands in SKILL.md and file system write operations in scripts/generate_image.py.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanism for escaping or validating user input before it is interpolated into shell commands or used in file path construction.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 4, 2026, 11:01 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — space-image-studio