space-logo-generator

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a shell command in Phase 3 (python3 scripts/generate_image.py ...) that interpolates user-provided data, such as brand names and generated prompts, directly into the command line arguments. An attacker could provide a brand name containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, or backticks) to execute arbitrary commands on the system.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The SKILL.md file hardcodes absolute filesystem paths targeting a specific user environment: /Users/ugreen/Documents/obsidian/09image/. Exposing specific local usernames and home directory structures reveals information about the host system and increases the risk of unauthorized file system operations if the path construction is manipulated.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download of image data from https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com. This is a well-known service provided by Google and is documented here as an external dependency of the skill.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from user-provided brand descriptions and analyzed image data (Phase 1). This content is directly used to form the prompt argument for the execution script. A lack of strict sanitization or escaping could allow an attacker to influence the final command or the behavior of the image generation model through embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 4, 2026, 11:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — space-logo-generator