space-slide-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface. The skill is designed to ingest untrusted user content to generate outlines and image prompts, which creates a risk of embedded instructions influencing the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-provided markdown content saved to
source.md(Step 1.2). - Boundary markers: Absent. Content is directly interpolated into templates defined in
references/base-prompt.mdandreferences/outline-template.mdwithout clear delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
python3,npx), write to the local filesystem, and perform network requests. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not perform validation or escaping of the user-supplied content.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
npx -y bunin Step 8 to run helper scripts. This involves downloading thebunruntime and Node.js packages (pdf-lib,pptxgenjs) from public registries at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for its core workflow.
- Uses
test -fandtest -dto check for configuration files and existing directories (Step 1.1, Step 1.3). - Executes
python3 scripts/generate_slide.pyto interface with an external image generation service (Step 7). - Executes
npx -y bunto run TypeScript scripts for merging files into PDF and PPTX formats (Step 8). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
scripts/generate_slide.pyscript performs network requests toapi.labnana.comusingurllib.request. This domain is used to send slide content for image generation. While functional, it is a non-whitelisted external service.
Audit Metadata