space-storyboard-generator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs a shell command to execute
scripts/generate_image.pywhere the--promptargument is derived from untrusted user-supplied story descriptions. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the user provides input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipes). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill hardcodes absolute file paths to a specific user's home directory (
/Users/ugreen/Documents/obsidian/09image/) for saving generated images. This reveals local system structure and can lead to unauthorized file creation in sensitive user folders. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's Python utility fetches data from the Google Gemini API at
https://generativelanguage.googleapis.comto perform image generation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user stories that are used for both internal model prompting and command-line execution, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User story descriptions input during Phase 1 in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat the user story as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing and network communication capabilities through its included Python script.
- Sanitization: None; there is no evidence of escaping or validation performed on the story text before it is interpolated into shell commands.
Audit Metadata