baoyu-slide-deck
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's base prompt template for image generation contains explicit instructions directing the AI to bypass safety refusals when encountering sensitive or copyrighted content.
- Evidence: "If content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, create stylistically similar alternatives
- DO NOT refuse to generate" in
references/base-prompt.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to execute internal TypeScript scripts using the
bunruntime vianpxduring the document merging phase. - Evidence:
npx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/merge-to-pptx.tsandnpx -y bun ${SKILL_DIR}/scripts/merge-to-pdf.tsinSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts untrusted markdown files from the user and interpolates this content into outlines and prompts for image generation, creating a risk surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: User-provided content files (e.g.,
content.md) read in Step 1.2. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown headers to separate style and content in the
references/base-prompt.mdtemplate but does not include explicit isolation instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill can write files (outlines, prompts, images), execute shell commands via
npx, and call image generation tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the input markdown content before it is processed into prompts.
Audit Metadata