rss-aggregator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of fetching and summarizing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/aggregate.pyscript reads content from a large list of external URLs defined inreferences/feeds.opmlusing thefeedparserlibrary. - Boundary markers: The script outputs summarized feed content using standard Markdown (e.g.,
### Titleand- **Summary**: {summary}). It lacks robust delimiters or explicit instructions for the agent to treat the summarized content as untrusted data or to ignore any embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to perform network requests (GET) to fetch RSS content and displays the results to the agent. It does not perform file-writes or execute shell commands based on the fetched content.
- Sanitization: The
clean_summaryfunction inscripts/aggregate.pyuses regex (re.sub(r'<[^>]+>', '', summary)) to strip HTML tags and unescapes HTML entities. While this cleans the presentation, it does not sanitize the underlying natural language text to prevent prompt injection or instruction overrides. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to fetch data from numerous external domains listed in
references/feeds.opml. While this is the intended purpose of the skill, the wide range of third-party sources increases the surface area for processing potentially malicious or deceptive content.
Audit Metadata