drawio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's core workflow involve generating a Node.js script (
build.mjs) and executing it using thedrawio-ai runcommand. As documented inreferences/api.md, these scripts import thenode:fsmodule to write the resulting diagram files to disk. Executing dynamically generated code with file system access is a high-capability operation that requires trust in the generation process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently invokes shell commands and CLI tools. This includes the
drawio-aiutility for various tasks (search, scaffold, run, validate, render) and external tools liketerraform,terramate, andgrepused in theworkflows/from-iac.mdworkflow to inventory infrastructure resources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it transforms user-supplied architectural descriptions into executable JavaScript code.
- Ingestion points: User requests defining diagram components, labels, and structures (SKILL.md Step 1).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted user input from the script logic during the code generation phase.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses file editing tools to create
build.mjs, which is subsequently executed viadrawio-ai run. The script has the capability to perform file system operations viawriteFileSync. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or escaping user-provided strings (such as labels or icon names) before they are interpolated into the generated script, potentially allowing a malicious user to inject arbitrary JavaScript code.
Audit Metadata