add-mcp-from-catalog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external MCP catalogs and server candidates, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via the
search_mcp_catalogandinspect_mcp_candidatetools as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit safeguards, such as requiring the agent to "collect only the non-secret configuration fields" and strictly forbidding the request of API keys or tokens in the chat interface.
- Capability inventory: The skill's tools are scoped to project management and MCP registration within the authenticated platform environment.
- Sanitization: The workflow is restricted to "reviewed" candidates from the server-owned catalog, reducing the risk of processing malicious third-party content.
- [SAFE]: The skill implements authentication best practices by directing users to external platform URLs for sensitive operations (OAuth/Connect) rather than attempting to process secrets within the AI's conversation context.
- [SAFE]: Data exfiltration risks are mitigated through strict rules on the
send_platform_mcp_feedbacktool, which requires user consent and prohibits the inclusion of identifiers, credentials, or payloads.
Audit Metadata