manage-mcp-access

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from platform tool outputs and user input, which creates a surface for potential indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like list_projects, find_mcp, list_access_roles, and list_access_members, as well as user-provided search queries (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly require the agent to stop at "confirmation points," "ask the user before any write," and present eligible choices for explicit user selection rather than inferring them.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes mutation tools such as create_mcp_access_role, update_mcp_access_role, and assign_mcp_access_role to modify access control state.
  • Sanitization: The skill mandates using only "masked identities" and "privacy-safe member counts" provided by the platform tools to avoid exposing raw identifiers or sensitive user data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references a platform execute tool for running multi-step read operations.
  • Evidence: The workflow describes how the execute tool may run tools.search, tools.describe, and tools.call on specific platform--<tool name> paths.
  • Safeguards: These operations are scoped to platform paths, and the skill includes a critical safety rule to "ask the user before any write" and end each execute run at a confirmation point.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 2, 2026, 09:17 PM