manage-mcp-access
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data from platform tool outputs and user input, which creates a surface for potential indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like
list_projects,find_mcp,list_access_roles, andlist_access_members, as well as user-provided search queries (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly require the agent to stop at "confirmation points," "ask the user before any write," and present eligible choices for explicit user selection rather than inferring them.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes mutation tools such as
create_mcp_access_role,update_mcp_access_role, andassign_mcp_access_roleto modify access control state. - Sanitization: The skill mandates using only "masked identities" and "privacy-safe member counts" provided by the platform tools to avoid exposing raw identifiers or sensitive user data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references a platform
executetool for running multi-step read operations. - Evidence: The workflow describes how the
executetool may runtools.search,tools.describe, andtools.callon specificplatform--<tool name>paths. - Safeguards: These operations are scoped to platform paths, and the skill includes a critical safety rule to "ask the user before any write" and end each
executerun at a confirmation point.
Audit Metadata