openhound-github
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external datasets including JSON snapshots and identity provider metadata. This creates an attack surface where data collected from third-party sources could contain instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during triage.
- Ingestion points: Workflow steps in
SKILL.mdinvolve analyzing JSON snapshots and GitHound samples located in the../../references/directory. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions provided to separate the external data from the skill's instructions or to treat the ingested data as untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill body and referenced metadata do not define any automated scripts, network operations, or file system write capabilities.
- Sanitization: The instructions recommend that the agent "adapt parameters safely" when constructing queries, but do not provide specific sanitization or validation logic for the external input.
Audit Metadata