documentation-specialist
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Several reference files and documentation templates include hardcoded database connection strings containing literal credentials. While these are likely intended as examples, the use of values such as 'admin:pass' and 'user:pass' rather than secure placeholders constitutes a security risk.
- Evidence found in
references/reference/06-deployment-runbooks.md:DATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:pass@replica.db.com:5432/tasks. - Evidence found in
references/reference/06-deployment-runbooks.md:DATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:pass@primary.db.com:5432/tasks. - Evidence found in
references/reference/06-deployment-documentation.md:DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@db:5432/tasks. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external, potentially untrusted source code and configuration files to generate documentation. It has significant capabilities including
Write,Edit, andBashaccess, but lacks proper defensive measures for data ingestion. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
Read,Glob, andGreptools when analyzing codebases as defined inreferences/workflows/brownfield-workflow.mdand various mapping files inreferences/mappings/. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill instructions do not require the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(shell execution),Write, andEditcapabilities across its core documentation generation workflows. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no logic or instruction to sanitize or validate content extracted from external codebases before it is interpolated into prompts or written to the file system.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata