caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external binaries such as the
claudeCLI andopencodeusing thesubprocessmodule. - Evidence:
scripts/compress.pycallssubprocess.runwithin therun_clifunction to interact with configured LLM providers. - Mitigations: The skill avoids using
shell=Trueand passes arguments as a list, reducing the risk of command injection. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function is to send the text of local files to external LLM providers (Anthropic, Opencode, or user-defined OpenAI-compatible endpoints).
- Evidence: File contents are read in
scripts/compress.pyand transmitted via HTTP requests or CLI stdin. - Mitigations: A robust
is_sensitive_pathheuristic inscripts/compress.pyblocks the compression of files that likely contain secrets, such as.env,.ssh/id_rsa,.aws/credentials, and files containing keywords likepasswordortoken. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data (local files) and interpolates it into prompts sent to an LLM.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/compress.pyreads file content usingread_source. - Boundary markers: The prompt in
build_compress_promptuses aTEXT:label but lacks strong delimiters. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to overwrite local files and perform network requests to LLM providers.
- Sanitization: The skill implements
mask_code_blocksto protect technical content from modification and a structuralvalidatestep inscripts/validate.pyto ensure headings, code blocks, and URLs are not corrupted by the LLM response.
Audit Metadata