caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/compress.pyinvokes theclaudeCLI tool usingsubprocess.runto perform compression when the Anthropic SDK is not available. The command uses a fixed argument list and passes user content via standard input to prevent shell injection.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes the content of user-specified natural language files by interpolating them into a prompt for the LLM. This creates a surface where malicious instructions within a file could attempt to influence the LLM's output during the compression process.\n - Ingestion points: The skill reads files provided via the
/caveman-compresscommand.\n - Boundary markers: The prompt in
scripts/compress.pyuses aTEXT:label but lacks high-entropy delimiters or explicit instructions to the LLM to ignore embedded commands.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read and write files and execute the local
claudeCLI.\n - Sanitization: While code blocks are masked to prevent modification, the prose content is not sanitized against prompt injection patterns.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator script utilizes
subprocess.runto execute a local binary (claude) determined at runtime usingshutil.whichto handle communication with the compression service.
Audit Metadata