nextjs

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides code templates that ingest untrusted data from form inputs and API responses, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Templates in server-action-form.tsx and route-handler-api.ts process data from formData and request.json().
  • Boundary markers: Not included in the template logic.
  • Capability inventory: The templates demonstrate capabilities for network operations (fetch), database mutations, and local file system writes (fs.writeFile).
  • Sanitization: templates/app-router-async-params.tsx contains an example using dangerouslySetInnerHTML, which is a vector for injection if the source content is untrusted.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a utility script (scripts/check-versions.sh) designed to run locally to verify software versions and project structure.
  • Evidence: The script executes node -p, find, and grep to analyze the project environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill metadata contains deceptive authorship claims.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md identifies the author as 'Claude Skills Maintainers', which conflicts with the provided developer context of 'spiosifidis'.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 11, 2026, 09:45 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — nextjs