route
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/route.mjsexecutes several system commands to manage the background Codex worker and its environment: bash -cis used to launch thecodexCLI in a detached background process with redirected input and output.nodeis used to execute thecodex-companion.mjsscript from the Codex plugin.pkill -fis used to terminate thecodex app-serverprocess to resolve stale authentication states.whichorwhereis used to locate thecodexbinary on the system path.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy for a sub-agent (Codex), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via the command-line prompt argument or the contents of a file provided via the
--prompt-fileflag inscripts/route.mjs. - Boundary markers: The wrapper does not inject explicit boundary markers or safety instructions into the prompt; it relies on the user to scope the task correctly.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the file system (logs and metadata in
~/.claude/route-jobs/) and execute subprocesses (viaspawnandspawnSyncinscripts/route.mjs). - Sanitization: The wrapper uses shell-safe argument passing (
"$@") when invoking the background worker to prevent command injection into its own shell execution environment.
Audit Metadata