deglacer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a CLI tool using
uv tool installfrom a local file system path (~/Repos/batterie/deglacer), which constitutes an external dependency installation outside of the skill's own file set. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse Claude Code session logs (
~/.claude/projects/), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious content stored in past conversations (from human messages or tool outputs) could influence the agent's behavior when this data is processed. - Ingestion points: Session history files in
.jsonlformat located within~/.claude/projects/subdirectories. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded instructions are included in the extraction recipes.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(permitting file system access and execution),Read,Grep, andGlobtools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the historical conversation data before it is presented to the agent for interpretation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous complex
Bashcommands andjqfilters to be executed by the agent for the purpose of exploring and searching session history on the host machine.
Audit Metadata