skills/spm1001/trousse/deglacer/Gen Agent Trust Hub

deglacer

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing a CLI tool using uv tool install from a local file system path (~/Repos/batterie/deglacer), which constitutes an external dependency installation outside of the skill's own file set.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and parse Claude Code session logs (~/.claude/projects/), creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious content stored in past conversations (from human messages or tool outputs) could influence the agent's behavior when this data is processed.
  • Ingestion points: Session history files in .jsonl format located within ~/.claude/projects/ subdirectories.
  • Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded instructions are included in the extraction recipes.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash (permitting file system access and execution), Read, Grep, and Glob tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the historical conversation data before it is presented to the agent for interpretation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous complex Bash commands and jq filters to be executed by the agent for the purpose of exploring and searching session history on the host machine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 08:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — deglacer