migrate-optimizely
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions require the agent to use
dangerouslyDisableSandbox: trueat the start of every invocation to initialize telemetry, which bypasses default security restrictions for shell command execution. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits telemetry data to
https://events.eu.confidence.dev. This data includes user session identifiers, step timing, and a manual assessment of the user's "sentiment" based on their interaction style. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: During telemetry setup, the skill fetches a client secret from a remote endpoint (
https://onboarding.confidence.dev) and pipes it directly into a Python interpreter (python3 -c) for execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a plan file containing executable shell and MCP commands during the planning phase, which are then processed and executed by the
/migrate-optimizely executecommand. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs automated execution of shell and MCP commands stored in a local markdown plan file during the migration process.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external APIs (Optimizely) and local source code without explicit sanitization or delimitation instructions.
- Ingestion points: Flag definitions from Optimizely API/files and source code files scanned during Phase 2.
- Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions for using delimiters or "ignore" warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands and MCP tools (createFlag, addTargetingRule, resolveFlag) during the execution phase.
- Sanitization: Absent; no logic provided to escape or validate external content before inclusion in the plan.
Audit Metadata