ux-copy
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-provided 'briefs' to generate UI copy, which introduces an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the 'brief' referenced in SKILL.md (Step 1 and Step 4). 2. Boundary markers: The instructions do not include boundary markers or delimiters to isolate user input from the skill's instructions. 3. Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are restricted to text generation; it does not utilize network access, file system writes, or subprocess execution. 4. Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation of the input brief.
Audit Metadata