planning
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
references/skill-routing.mdandreferences/project-md-template.mdrecommends executing an unpinned third-party package from the npm registry vianpx @stevestomp/ohno-cli. Dynamic execution of unpinned packages can pose supply chain risks if the third-party package is compromised. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts provided in
references/skill-routing.mdexecute shell commands usingnpxcombined with piped inline Node.js evaluation commands (node -e). This pattern relies heavily on the runtime integrity of the external tool. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to parse and process untrusted external text inputs, specifically Product Requirement Documents (PRDs) and concept briefs, exposing it to indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities.
- Ingestion points: Processes external files through the
[path-to-prd]argument specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or strict boundary markers defined to isolate user text from the model instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify and create project hierarchies (epics, stories, tasks) in the local tracking system via MCP tools.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or safety filters are applied to the ingested PRD data before processing.
Audit Metadata