sruja-architecture
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill and its included scripts (e.g.,
collect-evidence.sh,validate-refine.sh) utilize a remote installation script viacurl -fsSL https://sruja.ai/install.sh | bash. This pattern executes code directly from the vendor's domain (sruja.ai) to install the required CLI tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions and prompt templates in
SKILL.mdandreferences/PROMPTS.mdguide the agent to execute shell commands such assruja sync,sruja discover,sruja lint, andsruja drift. These are used to gather evidence from the local filesystem and validate the architecture DSL. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external downloads from
sruja.aifor tool installation. It also suggests usingnpx @sourcegraph/scip-typescript --inferfor semantic indexing, which downloads packages from the npm registry. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the local codebase (source code, imports, and comments) to synthesize architectural boundaries and elements.
- Ingestion points: Files processed by
sruja discoverandsruja syncacross the repository. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the data being analyzed during synthesis.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for CLI commands, file creation for architecture proposals and DSL files.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the ingested code content is performed before processing.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://sruja.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata