faceless-explainer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted text from the user (e.g., articles or notes) into
capture/extracted/visible-text.txt. This content is later processed by the agent to create a storyboard and passed to sub-agents for frame construction. - Ingestion points:
capture/extracted/visible-text.txt,BRIEF.md, anduser_script.txt(SKILL.md Step 1). - Boundary markers: The workflow references
../hyperframes/references/subagent-dispatch.mdand../hyperframes/references/frame-worker-core.mdto guide sub-agent behavior and boundaries. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
spawnSyncto execute media tools (ffmpeg,ffprobe) and utilizes thenpxCLI for project management and rendering tasks. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the ingested text in the provided scripts; the skill relies on the agent's instructions and platform-level dispatch guardrails to handle the content safely.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically assembles 'frame packets' for sub-agents in
scripts/lib/frame-packets-core.mjs. These packets include storyboard blocks, blueprint bodies, and motion recipes which are then used by sub-agents to generate HTML/JS compositions. While this is the primary function of the skill, the runtime assembly of executable instructions represents a dynamic execution vector. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local commands using
child_process.spawnSync. Specifically,scripts/assemble-index.mjsandscripts/audio.mjsinvokeffmpegandffprobefor audio processing and looping. The skill employs the--argument separator as a security best practice to mitigate potential command-line option injection from untrusted filenames.
Audit Metadata