media-use

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages user credentials for HeyGen and Google Cloud services, resolving secrets from environment variables or local configuration files located in ~/.heygen/ and ~/.hyperframes/. Secrets are used to authenticate requests to media generation APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches color grade LUTs from HeyGen's CDN (static.heygen.ai), retrieves sound effects from the Openverse API, and downloads synthesized media from provider-specific signed URLs. A dedicated fetch utility implements a blocklist to prevent SSRF against internal networks.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's runtime environment facilitates the installation of third-party Python packages (transformers, torch, google-genai, etc.) from PyPI using pip to enable local generative capabilities for background music and transcription.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Spawns system processes for media processing (ffmpeg, ffprobe), language interpretation (python3), and Node.js package execution (npx). Subprocess arguments are constructed from user-supplied intents, though generally handled as data arrays rather than raw shell strings.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Employs dynamic script generation for media tasks, such as background music creation using MusicGen. Template-generated Python code is executed via the python3 -c flag, with user inputs escaped using JSON.stringify to prevent code injection.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transmits anonymous usage telemetry (event names, media types, and provider selection) to a PostHog instance. The implementation explicitly excludes sensitive metadata like intent text or file paths and filters out user IP addresses.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied intents, audio script text, and JSON request files enter the context from untrusted sources.
  • Boundary markers: Uses structured JSON for data exchange and applies standard escaping before content interpolation into command arguments or scripts.
  • Capability inventory: Capability to execute shell commands and Python interpreters with inputs derived from ingested data.
  • Sanitization: Inputs are primarily sanitized via JSON serialization and the use of argument arrays in spawn and execFileSync calls to avoid shell interpretation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 19, 2026, 06:23 PM