telegram-userbots
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes functionality for reading and processing Telegram message history via
iter_messagesanditer_dialogs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions embedded in external messages could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Untrusted message data enters the context from the Telegram network as described in
references/entities-and-history.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not provide specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the message history.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network communication capabilities via
SKILL.mdand file system access for session management as described inreferences/sessions-and-auth.md. - Sanitization: There are no instructions for sanitizing or validating the content of messages before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
telethonPython library for MTProto communication. It recommends strict version pinning (e.g.,telethon==1.44.0) to ensure stability across protocol updates. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation discusses the management of Telegram session strings and API credentials. While it advocates for secure storage in environment variables and secret stores, these artifacts represent full account access and are primary targets for exposure if handled incorrectly.
Audit Metadata