generating-flow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill employs extremely directive and repetitive instructions (e.g., 'MANDATORY', 'STRICT', 'No exceptions', 'No shortcuts') to enforce a specific execution path. While intended for technical accuracy, such patterns are analyzed for their potential to override core model constraints.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the
userPromptand local project files (inflightMetadata). There are no defined boundary markers or sanitization steps to prevent embedded instructions in these sources from hijacking the flow generation process. - Ingestion points:
userPromptinput andinflightMetadata(scanned from local sfdx project files). - Boundary markers: Absent; data is passed directly into tool parameters without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Calls
execute_metadata_actionto fetch schema, select elements, and generate XML metadata. - Sanitization: Not observed in the instruction set.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates multiple calls to the
execute_metadata_actiontool, including a repetitive loop in the final step. The instructions mandate that the agent must not pause or seek user confirmation during this loop, which reduces human oversight over the generated output.
Audit Metadata