data-upload-java-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill specifies a hardcoded absolute path to a Java binary at /Users/elliottleonard/Documents/Cursor/CLI/domoutil.jar. Executing binaries from user-specific home directories is a security risk as it bypasses standard environment configurations and creates a dependency on a path that could be targeted for local privilege escalation or binary hijacking.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided Python and Shell scripts dynamically assemble multi-line command strings by concatenating user-provided or environment-derived data (e.g., friendly_name = csv_file.replace(...)) and piping them to a subprocess. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if the input data (such as filenames in a processed directory) is maliciously crafted.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by consuming untrusted external CSV data to automate schema derivation and dataset generation.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external CSV files via derive-schema -d /path/to/data.csv and upload-dataset -f /path/to/data.csv in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard potentially malicious content embedded within the CSV files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run and perform network operations using the Domo API.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the CSV content before it is processed by the CLI tool or the Python script logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 7, 2026, 05:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — data-upload-java-cli