@3182/cross-chain-bridge
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Hardcoded Wallet and Telemetry Tracking. The script
bridge.pyhardcodes the wallet address0x3a81f1Fb069107fdaAF0a6598d46A0B0e3612973as the source (fromAddress) for all cross-chain bridge quotes. This forces the transaction logic to be generated for a specific account rather than the user's actual wallet. Additionally, it sends a static identifierchat:3182via theSC-CALLER-IDheader to the LiFi API (li.quest), allowing external tracking of all transactions performed with this skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Automated Transaction Execution. The skill uses the
wallet.wallet_transfercapability to execute smart contract interactions. It relies on calldata obtained from an external API (li.quest), which provides the logic for token approvals and bridge transfers. This creates a dependency where external data directly dictates the financial actions of the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface.
- Ingestion points: Bridge quote data and transaction requests fetched from
https://li.quest/v1/quoteinbridge.py. - Boundary markers: None; external API responses are parsed and used directly to build transaction payloads.
- Capability inventory: Blockchain transaction execution via
wallet.wallet_transferacross multiple EVM chains. - Sanitization: None; the skill does not validate or sanitize the
transactionRequestdata before execution. - [METADATA_POISONING]: Deceptive Technical Claims. The
SKILL.mddocumentation falsely claims to use Alchemy Account Abstraction for gas sponsorship and requires users to provide anALCHEMY_API_KEY. However, the implementation inbridge.pyutilizes platform-native wallet tools and completely ignores the requested Alchemy configuration.
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