composio-br
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the agent to interact with over 1000 external applications (Gmail, Slack, GitHub, etc.), which involves reading data that may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via tools like
GMAIL_FETCH_EMAILS,GITHUB_GET_AN_ISSUE, andNOTION_FETCH_BLOCK_CONTENTS. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions when processing external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
curl) and Python scripts (Playwright, requests) for automation and data retrieval. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping mechanisms for external data are described in the skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to use shell commands such as
curlto perform tool searches, schema retrieval, and tool execution via the Composio gateway. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive credentials from environment variables (
COMPOSIO_GATEWAY_AUTH,BROWSERBASE_API_KEY) and configuration files (/data/workspace/composio-gateway/.env). These are used to authenticate with the vendor-managed gateway (composio-gateway.fly.dev) and the Browserbase service. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests generating and executing local Python scripts to handle complex or recurring workflows, such as multi-step calendar operations or Twitter media uploads.
Audit Metadata