control-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates on untrusted web content, which presents an attack surface for instructions embedded in third-party websites.
- Ingestion points: The
page_snapshotandpage_flowtools (SKILL.md) ingest external DOM content and text into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The documentation in
docs/browser-safety.mdprovides explicit defensive instructions to treat page content as data rather than instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to perform network actions and form submissions via
element_click,element_input, andpage_flowtools. - Sanitization: The skill mandates robust user confirmation requirements in
docs/confirmations.mdfor any consequential or sensitive actions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions regarding visibility and internal terminology were evaluated for potential concealment.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdanddocs/visibility.mdprovide guidance on narrating background actions and avoiding internal technical jargon in user communications. - Analysis: These instructions were found to be benign, aimed at improving user experience and maintaining transparency by requiring the agent to proactively inform the user of actions taken in background tabs.
Audit Metadata