kanban-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data (task titles, descriptions, checklist items) from a remote Kanban board API which is then provided to the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Data is retrieved via kb_list_tasks, kb_get_task, and kb_summary in exports.py.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when presenting board data to the agent in SKILL.md.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has extensive write capabilities to the board (create/delete boards, columns, and tasks) and file system write capabilities via kb_export_for_sharing.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content is performed in exports.py before returning data to the agent.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python's shutil and os modules to programmatically modify and distribute its own source code.
  • Evidence: The kb_export_for_sharing function in exports.py reads its own source file, performs string replacement to inject a board URL into the DISTRIBUTED_BOARD_URL variable, and writes the modified script to a new location on the file system (output/kanban-agent-share/).
  • Impact: While intended for legitimate sharing, this pattern involves generating executable code at runtime, which is a behavior that could be abused if the input URL is not properly validated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 08:21 PM