mantle-openclaw-competition

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install a package directly from a third-party GitHub repository (github:mantle-xyz/mantle-agent-scaffold) and execute it. This introduces an external dependency that is not verified or pinned to a specific version, presenting a potential supply chain risk.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author identified in the skill metadata (mantle-xyz) and the author provided in the instruction context (starchild-ai-agent), which may cause confusion regarding the skill's origin and security standing.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data returned from external blockchain queries via the mantle-cli tool, creating an injection surface. \n
  • Ingestion points: Data returned from mantle-cli catalog, mantle-cli swap pairs, and mantle-cli lp find-pools as referenced in SKILL.md. \n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions mandate using --json output for machine parseability but lack explicit directives for the agent to sanitize or ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in blockchain metadata (e.g., token names or pool descriptions). \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including performing on-chain financial transactions and interacting with various DeFi protocols. \n
  • Sanitization: No validation or filtering mechanisms are specified for the external data ingested from the CLI tool before it is utilized to inform agent logic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Nov 8, 2026, 08:21 PM